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More than Just a Different Face? Judicial
Diversity and Decision-making
Rosemary Hunter *
Abstract: This article addresses a key question in debates around judicial di-
versity: what evidence is there that a more diverse judiciary will make a differ-
ence to substantive decision-making? The article begins by outlining the range
of arguments for a more diverse judiciary which include, but are not confined
to, making a difference to substantive decision-making. It then turns to con-
sider the considerable evidence which now exists both to refute and to support
the existence of substantive differences in decision-making following the
appointment to the judiciary of women and others from non-traditional back-
grounds. On the basis of this evidence, it draws conclusions as to the kinds of
differences in decision-making which might be expected, and the circumstances
under which different approaches to decision-making are likely to flourish.
Introduction
There has been significant attention paid in England and Wales in recent
years to the need for greater judicial diversity; in particular, the need to
appoint more women judges. The judicial appointments system was
changed in 2006, replacing the old system of ‘tap on the shoulder’ and
‘secret soundings’, which inevitably reproduced the profile of the existing
incumbents, with a Judicial Appointments Commission whose mandate
is to operate a transparent system based on applications and appointment
on merit, and to increase the diversity of those applying for judicial
office.1 An Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by Baroness
Neuberger, was appointed in 2009 and reported in 2010, making 53
recommendations for progressing the objective of achieving a more
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diverse judiciary.2 A Judicial Diversity Taskforce was subsequently ap-
pointed to oversee implementation of the recommendations, which has
published three annual progress reports.3 In 2011, the House of Lords
Constitution Committee held an inquiry into judicial appointments,
which paid particular attention to the issue of judicial diversity.4
In 2013, the Crime and Courts Act introduced a new statutory duty
on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to encourage judicial
diversity.5 And in 2014, a report commissioned by the Shadow Secretary
of State for Justice made recommendations as to what a future Labour
government could do to ‘speed up moves to a more diverse judiciary’.6
An important question begged by all of this activity is why we should
want a more diverse judiciary, and in particular, whether it would make
any difference to judicial decision-making. This was a question floated by
the President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, on BBC Radio 4’s
Law in Action programme in 2013. He professed to be unsure whether
women judged differently from men, and wondered if it would be pos-
sible to tell, from reading a selection of anonymized judgments, which
were written by women and which by men.7 This challenge was taken up
by Law in Action, which conducted an experiment in the terms proposed
by Lord Neuberger with students at Durham Law School. The students
were presented with 16 Court of Appeal judgments in the areas of family
law, employment law, and criminal law, eight written by men and eight
written by women, and asked to identify the gender of each judgment-
writer.8 The results were equivocal. The students correctly identified the
2 Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, The Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial
Diversity 2010 (Ministry of Justice 2010).
3 Judicial Diversity Taskforce, Improving Judicial Diversity: Progress Towards the
Delivery of the ‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010’ (Ministry of
Justice 2011); Judicial Diversity Taskforce, Improving Judicial Diversity: Progress Towards
the Delivery of the ‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010’ (Ministry of
Justice 2012); Judicial Diversity Taskforce, Improving Judicial Diversity: Progress Towards
the Delivery of the ‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010’ (Ministry of
Justice 2013).
4 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments
(HL 2012, 72).
5 Crime and Courts Act 2013, sch 13, s 11, inserting new s 137A in the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005.
6 Sir Geoffrey Bindman QC and Karon Monaghan QC, Judicial Diversity: Accelerating
Change (Labour Party 2014) 2.
7 BBC Radio 4, Law in Action, ‘The Neuberger Experiment’ (20 June 2013)<http://
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b02x7t3w> accessed 21 November 2014.
8 ibid. This, of course, did not represent a random sample of Court of Appeal judg-
ments, since at the time there were only five women on the Court of Appeal. To achieve a
reasonable representation of judgments by women, it was necessary to focus on areas where
judgments by more than one woman were available, resulting in the choice of areas noted.
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gender of the judge about half the time, and were incorrect half the time.
That is, they did no better than tossing a coin to determine the gender of
each judicial author.9 As Erika Rackley concluded, the experiment said
more about the students’ assumptions about gender performance than it
did about any actual gender differences in decision-making.10 The kind
of gender stereotypes they employed—for example, expecting women to
be more attentive to emotions and feelings and to emphasize gender
equality, while expecting men to be less sensitive and more matter-of-
fact—proved not to be reliable predictors of the sex of the judge.
A similar question about the impact of greater diversity on decision-
making was broached by the House of Lords Constitution Committee
when Lord Pannick asked Lady Hale, during her appearance before the
Committee, whether she could provide any evidence that ‘substantive
decisions being taken would or may be different if the composition of the
appeal courts were different’.11 She replied:
I used to be quite sceptical about these arguments that it made a difference.
The more I have thought and read about it and the more that I have experi-
enced being in a collective court, the more I have thought that, yes, a differ-
ence can be made. I think it could be made on anything. You may be aware
that there was a very interesting project recently, the Feminist Judgments
Project, where some academic, feminist lawyers decided that they would re-
write from a feminist perspective the judgments in a range of mostly famous
cases from areas all round the law. Sometimes they reached exactly the same
conclusion but with a different reasoning and sometimes they reached a dif-
ferent conclusion, demonstrating with varying degrees of success that where
you start from can have an effect on where you end up.. . . that is the best
answer I can give: go and read that book.12
This response might be taken to suggest that if not all women judges,
then certainly feminist judges might make a difference to substantive
decision-making, a point to which I shall return below. The questions
asked by Lord Neuberger and Lord Pannick, however, demonstrate an
ongoing concern, and a lack of clarity and certainty, as to whether a more
diverse judiciary will make a difference to substantive decision-making,
and if so, how and when such a difference might be made. This article
addresses these questions. In doing so, it goes beyond well-established
theoretical arguments to examine new and emerging empirical evidence
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 4) 272.
12 ibid.
3Judicial Diversity and Decision-Making
on the subject, from a range of sources. I argue that non-traditional judges
clearly may reach different decisions, but their willingness and ability to
do so are constrained. I further argue that while some constraints are
unavoidable, others are unnecessary and should be reversed in the inter-
ests of better decision-making. Before proceeding with my specific argu-
ment about substantive diversity, I shall first place it in context by
reviewing the range of reasons for having a (more) diverse judiciary.
Why Should We Want a More Diverse Judiciary?
At the outset of this discussion, it is necessary to acknowledge some
unevenness in the available sources. While there is some literature on
the importance of judicial diversity from the point of view of race, eth-
nicity, and sexuality,13 there is, by contrast, an extensive feminist litera-
ture speculating or making claims about the difference women judges
might make.14 Madame Justice Bertha Wilson of the Canadian Supreme
Court delivered her landmark lecture, ‘Will Women Judges Really Make
a Difference?’,15 at Osgoode Hall Law School in February 1990. Since
then, dozens if not hundreds of articles and reports have been written on
that topic. The following discussion therefore focuses on women judges
and gender difference, although all of the arguments apply, mutatis
mutandis, to other forms of diversity—not forgetting, of course, that
gender and other forms of diversity are not mutually exclusive, so
women judges may also be Black, Asian, lesbian and/or from a working
class background—see, for example, US Supreme Court Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, former England and Wales High Court judge Linda Dobbs,
13 Eg Barbara Luck Graham, ‘Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts:
An Overview’ (1990) 74 Judicature 28; Susan Moloney Smith, ‘Diversifying the Judiciary:
The Influence of Gender and Race on Judging’ (1994) 28 U Richmond L Rev 179; Linda
Maria Wayner, ‘The Affirmatively Hispanic Judge: Modern Opportunities for Increasing
Hispanic Representation on the Federal Bench’ (2010) 16 Texas Wesleyan L Rev 535; Pat
K Chew and Robert E Kelley, ‘The Realism of Race in Judicial Decision Making: An
Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs’ Race and Judges’ Race’ (2012) 28 Harvard J Race Ethnic
Justice 91; Leslie J Moran, ‘Judicial Diversity and the Challenge of Sexuality: Some
Preliminary Findings’ (2006) 28 Sydney L Rev 565; Leslie J Moran, ‘Sexual Diversity
in the Judiciary in England and Wales: Research on Barriers to Judicial Careers’ (2013)
2(4) Laws 512.
14 Aside from numerous journal articles, see recent book-length studies by Rackley (n 1)
and Sally J Kenney, Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter
(Routledge 2013); and the collection edited by Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw, Gender
and Judging (Hart Publishing 2013).
15 Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, ‘Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?’
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ 507.
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and several of the current and former justices of the South African
Constitutional Court, among others.
To summarize the literature in a short space, there are six basic argu-
ments as to why and how women judges make a difference. The first three
arguments are symbolic. Firstly, the presence of women judges increases
the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, because a bench including
women is more representative of the wider society which it serves than
a bench with no women.16 Ideally, women should be represented on the
judiciary in equal numbers with men, since this would reflect their pro-
portions both in the general population and in the population of law
graduates for at least the past 15 years.17 Secondly, the presence of women
judges signals equality of opportunity for women in the legal profession
who aspire to judicial office,18 and demonstrates that judicial appoint-
ment processes are what they claim to be—fair, meritocratic, and
non-discriminatory. Thirdly, the presence of women judges provides
encouragement and active mentoring for women in the legal profession,
law students, and indeed younger women and girls, to aspire to, seek, and
obtain judicial appointment, thus creating a virtuous circle enabling the
gender balance in the judiciary to be improved.19
To the extent that women judges engage in active mentoring, this may
be seen as a practical rather than merely symbolic effect of their presence.
The fourth and fifth arguments as to why and how women judges make a
difference are also practical. The fourth argument is that women judges
are likely to have more empathy with women litigants and witnesses,
including victims of crime, and thus may provide a better courtroom
experience for these participants in the justice system, or at least one in
which they (and women lawyers) are not subjected to sexist comments or
other forms of gender bias from the bench, and in which overt sexism and
gender bias by others in the courtroom in the course of proceedings is not
16 This was the argument accepted and promoted by the House of Lords Constitution
Committee (n 4). See also Kenney (n 14); Kate Malleson, ‘Justifying Gender Equality on
the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do’ (2003) 11 Fem LS 1.
17 See <http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/> accessed 21 November 2014.
18 See eg Brenda Hale, ‘Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women
Judges?’ [2001] Public L 489. This is also part of Kenney’s argument (n 14).
19 This proposition is often expressed in the negative, ie that the absence of senior
women judges discourages women in the legal profession from considering judicial
office as a viable career option. See eg Hazel Genn, The Attractiveness of Senior Judicial
Appointment to Highly Qualified Practitioners: Report to the Judicial Executive Board
(Judicial Office for England and Wales 2008). For a positive version, see Ruth Cowan,
‘Do Women in South Africa’s Courts Make a Difference?’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 14) 321;
Eliane B Junqueira, ‘Women in the Judiciary: A Perspective from Brazil’ in Ulrike Schultz
and Gisela Shaw (eds), Women in the World’s Legal Professions (Hart Publishing 2003) 445.
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tolerated.20 The fifth argument is that women judges will exercise this
same lack of toleration behind the scenes, and so operate to educate and
civilize their male colleagues by not allowing sexist comments, stereotyp-
ing, and gender bias to go unquestioned.21
This putative approach by women judges leads on to the sixth, sub-
stantive, argument, that women judges will bring a gendered sensibility to
the process of decision-making, and thus (at least sometimes) alter the
outcomes of cases. There are, in turn, two main theories as to why and
how women judges will bring a gendered sensibility to bear. One theory is
that all judges bring their life experience to the process of judging, and
women’s life experiences—in particular, their experiences of pregnancy,
child-birth, child-rearing, and juggling work and family responsibilities,
as well as often of sexism and discrimination—are very different from
men’s. Thus, the inclusion of women’s experiences will make law more
representative of the variety of human experience.22 To illustrate, there is
an interesting throw-away observation in Penny Darbyshire’s book,
Sitting in Judgment, which is based on extensive observations of judges
at work. Darbyshire says:
Judges used their own experiences as reference points. In one case, where I
preferred the woman driver’s account, the judge explained why he preferred
the male lorry driver’s account.23
Regrettably, Darbyshire makes no further comment on this anecdote, but
it is implicit that had she been deciding the case, the woman driver would
have won. Given the predominance of male judges, this suggests a sys-
tematic tendency for judgments based on male life experience to prevail.
Homogeneity then becomes mistaken for neutrality,24 but in fact there is
20 See eg Brenda Hale, ‘A Minority Opinion?’ (2008) 154 P Brit Acad 319; Judith
Resnik, ‘On the Bias: Reconsideration of the Aspirations for our Judges’ (1988) 61 S
California L Rev 1877; Jason Schultz, ‘Can Women Judges Help Make Civil Sexual
Assault Trials More Therapeutic?’ (2001) 16 Wisconsin Women’s LJ 53.
21 See eg Brenda Hale and Rosemary Hunter, ‘A Conversation with Baroness Hale’
(2008) 16 Fem LS 237; Elaine Martin, ‘The Representative Role of Women Judges’
(1993) 77 Judicature 166; Mary M Schroeder, ‘Judging with a Difference’ (2002)
14 Yale JL and Feminism 255.
22 See eg Shirley S Abrahamson, ‘Do Women Judges Really Make a Difference? The
American Experience’ in Shimon Shetreet (ed), Women in Law (Kluwer 1998); Terence
Etherton, ‘Liberty, the Archetype and Diversity: A Philosophy of Judging’ [2010] Public L
727; Brenda Hale, ‘Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Judiciary’ (2005)
56 N Ireland LQ 281; Hale and Hunter (n 21); Rackley (n 1) ch 6; Wilson (n 15).
23 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing
2012) 237. Darbyshire’s research methods included ‘shadowing’ judges, sitting with them
on the bench and discussing their cases.
24 See Rackley (n 1) 164.
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a persistent bias which the presence of more women judges is needed to
correct.
The second theory is that women judge ‘in a different voice’, that is,
they apply a feminine ‘ethic of care’ as opposed to the masculine ‘ethic of
justice’.25 This theory is based on the work of Carol Gilligan and her
followers, who posit gender differences in moral reasoning, with the
feminine voice acknowledging and being concerned to preserve social
relationships, while the masculine voice tends to see individuals as atom-
istic and to make judgments according to a hierarchy of rights.26 To the
extent that both of these theories assume that all women share some
essential characteristics, they have been subject to sustained critique.27
Indeed, the results of Law in Action’s ‘Neuberger Experiment’ indicate
that it is impossible to ‘read off’ judicial gender from simple heuristics
based on either female life experience or the ethic of care. At the same
time, both theories appear to contain some grains of truth. In the remain-
der of this article, I shall investigate in more detail and in a more nuanced
way the argument that the identity of the judge might make a substantive
difference to judicial reasoning and decision-making.
The Impossibility of Substantive Diversity
To begin with the counter arguments, the contention that women might
theoretically judge differently is countered from several angles by argu-
ments that they do not and in fact cannot do so in practice. First, there is
the quantitative empirical literature which has sought to establish
whether or not women judges make a difference. Much of this literature
has been generated within the political science discipline in the USA, and
has usually involved large-scale databases of decisions made by State or
Federal benches, with statistical tests for the significance of judicial gender
25 See eg Sue Davis, ‘Do Women Judges Speak “In a Different Voice?”: Carol Gilligan,
Feminist Legal Theory and the Ninth Circuit’ (1993) 8 Wisconsin Women’s LJ 143;
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The
“Feminization” of the Legal Profession’ (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall LJ 897; Susanna
Sherry, ‘Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication’ (1986) 72
Virginia L Rev 543; Wilson (n 15).
26 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard UP 1982). See also eg Ellen C Du Bois
and others, ‘Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law: A Conversation’ (1985) 34
Buffalo L Rev 11; Robin West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 U Chicago L Rev 1.
27 See eg Rosemary Hunter, ‘Deconstructing the Subjects of Feminism: The
Essentialism Debate in Feminist Theory and Practice’ (1996) 6 Australian Fem LJ 135;
Rosemary Hunter, ‘Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?’ (2008) 15 Int J Legal
Profession 7, 13.
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as an independent variable explaining the outcomes of cases. The results
of these quantitative studies are equivocal, with many producing no
gender difference or finding that gender difference disappears when
other factors are controlled for, particularly judicial political affiliation
(that is, whether judges were appointed by a Democratic or Republican
President or Governor).28
There are, in turn, a number of possible explanations for this lack of
gender difference. One is common law judicial ideology—the notion that
whatever a judge’s background or beliefs may be, they are trumped by a
deeply acculturated set of norms and traditions of judicial decision-
making to which all judges tend to adhere. These norms include defer-
ence to the separation of powers and a limited judicial role, adherence to
precedent, incrementalism, and the upholding of ‘fundamental prin-
ciples’ of the common law, which may give rise to resistance to legislative
reforms that are perceived to contravene those principles.29 Thus, for
example, judges might resist giving full effect to mandatory sentencing
legislation because it encroaches on a traditional area of judicial discre-
tion.30 But they might also find ways to limit the scope of progressive
reforms designed to produce greater gender justice, such as rape shield
legislation31 and occupation orders in domestic violence cases,32 because
these appear to undermine fundamental rights (the right to a fair trial and
property rights, respectively). Indeed, Fielding cites one of the women
28 For overviews of the research evidence, see Dermot Feenan, ‘Editorial Introduction:
Women and Judging’ (2009) 17 Fem LS 1; Kenney (n 14) 28–39 (also critiquing the
assumptions and approach of many of these studies). Those finding no difference include:
Thomas G Walker and Deborah J Barrow, ‘The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications’ (1985) 47 J Politics 596; John Gruhl, Cassia Spohn and
Susan Welch, ‘Women as Policy-Makers: The Case of Trial Judges’ (1989) 25 Am J Polit
Sci 308; Sarah Westergren, ‘Note: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited: The
Data Since 1994’ (2004) 92 Georgetown LJ 689; Susan W Johnson and Donald R Songer,
‘Judge Gender and the Voting Behaviour of Justices on Two North American Supreme
Courts’ (2009) 30 Justice System J 265 (in relation to US but not Canadian judges).
29 See eg Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘The Judges: Active or Passive?’ (2007) 139 P Brit
Acad 55; Nigel G Fielding, ‘Judges and Their Work’ (2011) 20 Social L S 97; Harry
Annison, ‘Interpreting the Politics of the Judiciary: The British Senior Judicial Tradition
and the Pre-emptive Turn in Criminal Justice’ (2014) 41 JL Soc 339.
30 The example given by both Fielding, ibid and Annison, ibid.
31 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45. For a feminist alternative, see Clare
McGlynn, ‘R v A (No 2)’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds),
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing 2010) 211.
32 Eg Chalmers v Johns [1999] 1 FLR 392; Re Y (Children) (Occupation Order) [2000] 2
FCR 470; see also Felicity Kaganas, ‘Occupation Orders Under the Family Law Act 1996’
(1999) 11 Child and Family LQ 193. On judicial obstruction of domestic violence laws
more generally, see Rosemary Hunter, Domestic Violence Law Reform and Women’s
Experience in Court: The Implementation of Feminist Reforms in Civil Proceedings
(Cambria Press 2008).
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judges he interviewed referring to s 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act 1999—the rape shield provision which was read down by
the House of Lords in R v A (No 2)33—as ‘that ludicrous stuff about rape,
previous sexual experience of the complainant, completely unjust, which
the House of Lords happily found their way around with the help of the
European Convention’.34
A related point, and arguably another element of judicial ideology,
is the invidiousness of difference—that is, the notion that exhibiting
difference of any kind is inimical to the judicial role. In other
words, women have been ‘let in’ to the judiciary on condition of
conformity to the prevailing (masculine) ethos,35 and any hint of
failure to conform would call into question their qualification to be a
judge. This is what Erika Rackley has termed the Little Mermaid
syndrome:
Like Anderson’s mermaid, [the woman judge] is induced to sell her voice in
order to walk on land (or enter the court room) with her prince; her dan-
gerous siren call is silenced, and in the silence, difference is lost.36
Several studies of women and other non-traditional judges have demon-
strated their unwillingness to step out of line, and a feeling that they must
distance themselves from any notion of difference in order to establish
their judicial authority and to be taken seriously by their peers and the
judicial hierarchy.37 This performance of ‘neutrality’ may even become
exaggerated, as a South Asian immigration judge interviewed by Hilary
Sommerlad stated:
The feeling of being an outsider did extend to how I behaved as a judge at
first. I felt terribly self-conscious, on guard, needing to make sure I was right
33 See n 31.
34 Fielding (n 29) 110.
35 Helena Kennedy, quoted in Rackley (n 1) 137. See also Margaret Thornton,
Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (OUP 1996).
36 Rackley (n 1) 137–38.
37 Eg Bryna Bogoch, ‘Lawyers in the Courtroom: Gender, Trials and Professional
Performance in Israel’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 19) 247; Hilary Sommerlad, ‘Let History
Judge? Gender, Race, Class and Performative Identity: A Study of Women Judges in
England and Wales’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 14) 355. This issue is possibly even more
acute in civil law systems: see eg Junquiera (n 19); Ulrike Schultz, ‘Women Lawyers in
Germany: Perception and Construction of Femininity’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 19); Andrea
L Gastron, M Angela Amante and Ruben Rodriguez, ‘Gender Arguments and Gender
Perspective in Legal Judgments in Argentina’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 14) 303; Beatriz
Kohen, ‘What’s in a Label? Argentine Judges’ Reluctance to Call Themselves Feminists’ in
Schultz and Shaw (n 14) 419.
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and also be seen to be doing it ‘properly’. So I may even have been harsher
than white judges.38
Moreover, conformity arises not merely from a subjective desire to ‘fit in’,
but is also objectively enforced. According to another of Sommerlad’s
interviewees, a regional tribunal judge of the social entitlement chamber,
if one of her decisions is appealed:
There are more males in the Upper Tier – it’s probably worse than the
officers’ mess. I know as a woman that if I’m seen to be particularly lenient
it will be seen as a negative thing so I’ve always tried to administer the law
directly, within the law.39
Even a feminist judge, who might be expected to take a more robust
approach to the issue of difference, may find it impossible to insert a
different perspective because the disciplinary techniques through which
lawyers and judges are constituted induce and enforce conformity to
established legal norms. In accordance with this view, some feminist
legal theorists have argued that law is impervious to a feminist approach,
that it is in the business of disqualifying rather than embracing feminist
knowledge,40 and that it provides no space for a judgment which is at
once informed by a feminist perspective and legally plausible.41 In a 1986
article, for example, Mary Jane Mossman contended that legal method—
involving characterization of the issues, choice of precedent, and the
canons of statutory interpretation—is a closed method of reasoning
which enforces the status quo and does not allow for the introduction
of feminist theory or concerns about gender justice.42 Thus, for instance,
a family judge interviewed as part of the Australian Feminist Judgments
Project43 regretted that she ‘not infrequently’ had to make decisions
‘that I know are the right decision in terms of the legal framework
in which I have to operate, but don’t actually sit well within my femin-
ist heart and soul’ (Judge 35: Circuit Court equivalent). Another
38 Sommerlad, ibid 367. The judge does not appear to be suggesting that harshness is a
particular characteristic of white judges, but rather that she went out of her way to be
unsympathetic to (presumptively non-white) applicants to avoid any notion that she might
have identified with them.
39 ibid 366.
40 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 1989).
41 Sandra Berns, To Speak as a Judge: Difference, Voice and Power (Ashgate 1999).
42 Mary Jane Mossman, ‘Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes’ (1987)
3 Wisconsin Women’s LJ 147.
43 Details of the various feminist judgment projects are provided below.
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interviewee went further in embracing a strict separation between law and
feminism:
Facilitator: Do you think there’s scope for a feminist approach to judging?
Respondent: Judging is judging. You judge on the criteria that you are sup-
posed to judge [on]. There is a religious approach. I don’t think there’s room
for religion. I don’t think there’s room for feminism . . . . I think you judge
on the criteria you’re supposed to judge [on]. Those extraneous things are
extraneous things and they shouldn’t be brought to bear on a judgment.
(Judge 28: Magistrates Court)44
The Contingency of Substantive Diversity
Against these pessimistic views and accounts lies the growing empirical
evidence that women judges do sometimes—or as Erika Rackley puts it ‘on
occasion’45—judge differently from men. I set out the empirical evidence
through the following section, but at this point, I pause to note that if we
accept that non-traditional judges will ‘on occasion’ judge differently
from the traditional incumbents of the judicial role, the key question
then becomes: ‘on what occasion/s?’. When might we expect those judges
to judge differently?
Conviction
One answer which I and others have previously given in relation to
women judges is: when they are feminists.46 As Sally Kenney has argued:
We need more feminist judges: judges who understand women’s experiences
and take seriously harm to women and girls, who ask the gender
question, ‘How might this law, statute, or holding affect men and women
differently?’; who interpret equal protection and discrimination law in light
of those provisions’ broad social change purposes; who value women’s lives
and women’s work; who do not believe women to be liars, whores, or
deserving of violence by nature; who question their own stereotypes and
predilections and listen to evidence; and who, simply put, believe in equal
justice for all.47
44 Note that Australian Magistrates are full-time, professional, salaried, judicial officers
who sit alone.
45 Rackley (n 1) 201.
46 See especially Hunter, ‘Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?’ (n 27).
47 Kenney (n 14) 15–16.
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The various feminist judgment projects now in existence seek to demon-
strate precisely the difference that feminist judges might make.48 In these
projects, participants rewrite selected legal decisions, imagining they were
a feminist judge sitting on the court alongside the original judges, and
writing the judgment a feminist judge might have written. In her evidence
to the House of Lords Constitution Committee mentioned at the begin-
ning of this article, and in subsequent lectures, Lady Hale has invoked the
UK Feminist Judgments book49 as the best objective evidence ‘that a dif-
ferent perspective can indeed make a difference’ to the reasoning and
outcome of appellate cases.50 Other judgment rewriting projects working
from minority rights,51 children’s rights,52 and ‘earth-centred’53 perspec-
tives similarly demonstrate that other kinds of knowledge and philosoph-
ical commitments can have a substantive effect on decision-making.
Space does not permit a thorough exposition of how a feminist per-
spective makes a difference to judicial decisions, although I have discussed
this at greater length elsewhere.54 Briefly, feminist judging does not
simply involve deciding for the woman (especially when there are
48 See Women’s Court of Canada:<http://womenscourt.ca> accessed 23 February 2015;
UK Feminist Judgments Project: <http://www.feministjudgments.org.uk> accessed
23 February 2015; Australian Feminist Judgments Project: <http://www.law.uq.edu.au/
the-australian-feminist-judgments-project> accessed 23 February 2015; Northern/Irish
Feminist Judgments Project: <http://www.feministjudging.ie/> accessed 23 February
2015; Feminist Judgments: US Supreme Court Edition: <http://sites.temple.edu/usfemi-
nistjudgments/> accessed 23 February 2015; Feminist International Judgments Project:
<http://ilg2.org/2014/01/16/invitation-to-participate-in-the-feminist-international-judg-
ments-project/> accessed 23 February 2015.
49 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From
Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing 2010).
50 Lady Hale, ‘Kuttan Menon Memorial Lecture: Equality in the Judiciary’ (13 February
2013) 20; Lady Hale, ‘Fiona Woolf Lecture for the Women Lawyers’ Division of the Law
Society: Women in the Judiciary’ (27 June 2014) 21–22.
51 Eva Brems (ed), Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the
ECHR (CUP 2013).
52 A Children’s Rights Judgments Project led by Helen Stalford (Liverpool) and Katherine
Hollingsworth (Newcastle) was launched in the UK in January 2015; see<http://www.liv.ac.
uk/law/research/european-childrens-rights-unit/childrens-rights-judgments/> accessed 25
February 2015.
53 A Wild Law Judgment Project sponsored by the Australian Earth Laws Alliance and
Southern Cross University was launched in November 2014. See<http://www.earthlaws.
org.au/events/wild-law-judgment-project/> accessed 25 February 2015.
54 See Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, ‘Feminist Judgments: An
Introduction’ in Hunter and others (n 49) 3; Rosemary Hunter, ‘An Account of Feminist
Judging’ in Hunter and others (n 49) 30; Rosemary Hunter, ‘Justice Marcia Neave: Case
Study of a Feminist Judge’ in Schultz and Shaw (n 14) 399; Heather Douglas, Francesca
Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter, ‘Reflections on Rewriting the Law’ in Heather
Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter (eds), Australian Feminist
Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Hart Publishing 2014) 19.
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women on both sides,55 or no women in the case56), nor does it constitute
a singular programme. It is informed by feminist theories and an under-
standing of gendered experience, but this may result, as indicated in the
quote from Kenney above, in a range of approaches, including noticing
the gender implications of apparently neutral rules and practices, challen-
ging gender bias in legal doctrine and judicial reasoning, or promoting
substantive equality. Particular characteristics of feminist judging include
paying attention to previously excluded or marginalized voices and ex-
periences and construing the facts of the case from that perspective; being
alert to intersectional experiences of gender and race/ethnicity, religion,
sexuality, age, and disability; placing facts and issues within their broader
social and legal context, often drawing upon relevant social science re-
search and legislative background materials; and reasoning from context
and the reality of lived experience rather than in abstract, categorical
terms.57 A feminist understanding of the issues may inform the charac-
terization of the facts, the interpretation of statute and precedent, the
development of doctrine, and/or the exercise of discretion.
It must be conceded, however, that the evidence provided by the fem-
inist judgment projects is restricted. The outcomes of the projects do, I
think, demonstrate that a feminist judgment can be a perfectly legitimate
and plausible legal judgment; that legal method is not impervious to a
feminist approach; and that law can be used to qualify as well as disqualify
feminist knowledge.58 But there is an important limitation on the realism
of the feminist judgments. Part of the strength of these judgments is that
the feminist judges operate under the same constraints as the original
judges deciding the relevant cases, in that they are decided as at the same
time, with the same materials as would have been available at that time, on
the state of the law as it existed at that time, and in accordance with the
relevant legislation and precedents. That is why they demonstrate so
55 Eg Alison Diduck, ‘Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-Sex Partner)’ in Hunter and
others (n 49) 102; Geraldine Hastings, ‘Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical
Separation)’ in Hunter and others (n 49) 139; Lois Bibbings, ‘R v Stone and Dobinson’
in Hunter and others (n 49) 234; Maleiha Malik, ‘R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High
School’ in Hunter and others (n 49) 336.
56 Eg, Linda Mulcahy and Cathy Andrews, ‘Baird Textile Holdings v Marks & Spencer Plc’
in Hunter and others (n 49) 189; Robin Mackenzie, ‘R v Brown’ in Hunter and others
(n 49) 247; Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan, ‘Dietrich v R’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 75;
Nan Seuffert, ‘Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs’ in
Douglas and others (n 54) 120; Lee Godden, ‘Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland
Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc v Minister for Environment and Heritage’ in Douglas and
others (n 54) 138.
57 See, in particular, Hunter, ‘An Account of Feminist Judging’ (n 54).
58 See Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments?’ (2012) 20 Fem LS 135.
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powerfully that the cases could have been reasoned and/or decided dif-
ferently. But the feminist judges were not bound by the full force of
judicial ideology, nor by the disciplining effects of having to establish
and maintain their credibility as judges in a male-dominated work en-
vironment. Thus, the achievements of these imagined feminist judges can
only take us so far, and it is necessary to turn to the practices of real judges
who are subject to the full range of constraints identified above.
In addition to rewriting judgments from a feminist perspective, one of
the aims of the Australian Feminist Judgments Project was to track the
influence of feminist legal theory on Australian jurisprudence. As part of
the project, therefore, my colleagues Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett,
and Trish Luker conducted 41 interviews with judges around the country
and at different court levels who either identified as feminists or were
prepared to be interviewed about their approach to judging by something
calling itself the Australian Feminist Judgments Project. All but one of the
interviewees were women.
Some of these women judges said they were feminists but not feminist
judges. One could not see the point of the feminist judgments project
because, she maintained, ‘there’s nothing in the law that requires an
anti-feminist approach to anything’ (Judge 07: High Court equivalent).
Around two-thirds of the judges interviewed, however, thought that they
did judge differently as feminists, either because they had a knowledge and
understanding of women’s life experiences which they brought to their
judicial role, or because they were concerned to promote equality and
justice and apply feminist principles in individual cases. At the opposite
end of the spectrum from the judge who saw no need for feminism in law
was the judge who carefully and consciously juggled precedent, judicial
ideology and the need to maintain her credibility with her feminism:
So you’re really doing a double act. You’re working out what the black letter
is . . . [b]ut you’re also trying to apply these feminist principles in the gaps
wherever you can. So it’s a double exercise. So you have to do this and then
you have to do this, and then you have to put [them] together. So it’s an
exhausting exercise . . . You have to be so careful, because if anything comes
through they’ll . . . lop you off, appeal it, or some little barrister will bob up
and down in court. (Judge 10: Crown Court equivalent)
So how can we tell which feminist judges might make a difference and
which might not? One of the interview questions in the Australian project
asked about the meaning of feminism to the interviewee. The responses to
this question fell into three broad categories. The first group said femin-
ism means women are equal and should be treated equally; the second
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group said feminism means ‘working to ensure equal opportunity and
equal recognition for women’ (Judge 03: Circuit Court equivalent); and
the third group described ways in which they had been feminist activists
in their pre-judicial lives and/or supported and mentored women and/or
engaged in social justice-related committee work in their judicial roles.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was the more active feminists in the second and
third groups who were more likely to describe themselves as more activist
feminist judges.59 For good or ill, this observation has clear implications
for the judicial appointment process.
Opportunity
But even for judges who are willing to be feminist activists, opportunities
to do so might be few and far between. Two kinds of limitations arise here.
First, there may be little scope for any form of judicial activism at the
court level or within the jurisdiction in which the judge is sitting. One
Australian industrial tribunal judge, for example, contrasted the workers’
compensation jurisdiction, where decision-making was highly con-
strained by precedent and the prospects of being appealed, with the
industrial jurisdiction, where decisions are made according to equity
and good conscience and the substantial merits of the case, and the
tribunal is not bound by legal forms and technicalities. ‘So if you think
that there’s an avenue that you can pursue which is going to make it more
equitable and that you might be able to imbue with some feminist prin-
ciples, you can probably do that’ (Judge 06). A Magistrate noted that she
was limited by the quality of the evidence put before the court, and was
sometimes frustrated by the fact that in domestic violence cases the police
had not brought all the evidence needed for someone’s protection (Judge
31). Another judge sitting in the equivalent of the Crown Court referred
to the fact that:
In a trial you’ve got very little ability or power to do anything about that,
you’re not the trier of fact. So all you can do is ensure that your directions—
well first of all they’ve got to comply with the law, you’ve got to put it all in.
We know that the directions we have to give to juries in rape cases are so
prescribed, and so cautious. In other words they provide many, many pro-
tections for the accused person, as they should. So many protections for the
59 See also Sean Rehaag, ‘Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make a Difference? An
Empirical Analysis of Gender and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee Determinations’
(2011) 23 Canadian J Women L 627, who found that female refugee adjudicators with
prior experience in women’s rights had higher average grant rates overall, in cases involving
female claimants; and in cases involving claims of gender-based persecution.
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accused person it’s very hard to get a conviction. I haven’t had a conviction
in a rape case for ages. (Judge 24)
Some mentioned sentencing as an area of greater discretion and latitude,
although here too there might be statutory mandatory sentences for some
offences, or an appeal court exercising a high degree of scrutiny and
laying down many technical requirements (Judges 11, 12, 17, 24, 37:
Magistrates and Crown Court equivalents).
Further, it appears that the majority of cases at all court levels and in all
jurisdictions (other, perhaps, than in family law) simply do not raise any
gender or feminist issues. This became evident when I conducted a
systematic study of all the judgments of a particular Australian judge
during the first three years of her appointment to a State Court of
Appeal.60 Justice Marcia Neave had a background as a feminist academic
and law reformer, so I was interested to see how she acted as a judge. But of
the 204 cases on which she sat during her first three years on the Court, try
as I might, I could only find a feminist or gender issue in 66 (32 per cent)
of them. The great majority of these were criminal matters—appeals
against conviction and/or appeals against sentence. The court’s civil jur-
isdiction appeared to consist mainly of dry, technical matters of statutory,
or contractual interpretation, to which a gender-sensitive approach had
no relevance.
Subsequently, Erika Rackley and I have begun a similar systematic
analysis of Lady Hale’s judgments on the UK Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court’s caseload is very different from that of the Victorian
Court of Appeal—much more heavily weighted towards civil than crim-
inal matters—and the figures are even lower: of the 326 cases decided by
the Supreme Court from its inception in October 2009 until July 2014,
only 85 (26 per cent) raised any kind of actual or potential feminist, or
gender issues. These cases have tended to arise in areas concerning human
beings, such as discrimination law, employment law, family law, housing
law, human rights, immigration/asylum law, and welfare law; whereas
Justice Neave’s cases tended to be concentrated in areas of sexual assault
against women and children, domestic violence, and property division
between former cohabitants.
These observations explain some others. First, where the US political
science studies have found a gender difference in judging, they have found
it in cases concerning ‘women’s issues’, such as sex discrimination and the
60 Hunter, ‘Justice Marcia Neave’ (n 54).
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award of spousal maintenance on divorce.61 In light of the foregoing
analysis, it seems entirely plausible that these quantitative studies
should find no gender difference in outcomes in the preponderance of
cases, but find it in particular kinds of cases. Secondly, the famous fem-
inist decisions by judges such as Justices Wilson62 and L’Heureux-
Dube´63 on the Canadian Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg on the US
Supreme Court,64 Justice Gaudron on the Australian High Court,65 and
indeed Lady Hale,66 have all (or almost all) been in cases raising fairly
61 Eg Elaine Martin, ‘Differences in Men and Women Judges: Perspectives on Gender’
(1989) 17 J Polit Sci 74; Sue Davis, Susan Haire, and Donald R Songer, ‘Voting Behaviour
and Gender in the US Court of Appeals’ (1993) 77 Judicature 129; David W Allen and
Diane E Wall, ‘Role Orientations and Women State Supreme Court Justices’ (1993) 77
Judicature 156; Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle, ‘Gender, Race and Partisanship on the
Michigan Supreme Court’ (2000) 63 Albany L Rev 1205; Donald R Songer and Kelley
A Crews-Myer, ‘’Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision-Making in State Supreme Courts’
(2000) 81 Social Science Q 750; Jennifer L Peresie, ‘Female Judges Matter: Gender and
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts’ (2004-05) 114 Yale LJ 1759;
Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle, ‘State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of Judicial
Gender’ (2005) 36 U Toledo L Rev 923; Christina L Boyd, Lee Epstein, and Andrew D
Martin, ‘Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging’’ (2010) 54 Am J Polit Sci 389;
Susan W Johnson, Donald R Songer and NA Jilani, ‘Judge Gender, Critical Mass, and
Decision-Making in the Appellate Courts of Canada’ (2011) 32(3) J Women Polit Policy
237; David Terpstra, ‘The Influence of the Gender and Race of the Judge and the Type of
Discrimination Charge on Court Case Outcomes’ (2013) 55(4) Int JLM 318.
62 Eg R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30 (access to abortion); R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR
852 (admission of evidence of battered woman syndrome).
63 Eg R v Seaboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 (admissibility of sexual history evidence); Moge v
Moge [1992] 3 SCR 813 (spousal support); Symes v Canada [1993] 4 SCR 695 (tax
deductibility of childcare expenses); R v Osolin [1993] 4 SCR 595, R v Carosella [1997]
1 SCR 80 (admissibility of rape victim’s counselling records); R v RDS [1997] 3 SCR 484
(judicial bias); R v Ewanchuck [1999] 1 SCR 330 (consent in rape).
64 Eg her dissents in Gonzales v Carhart 550 US 124 (2007) (abortion) and Ledbetter v
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co 550 US 618 (2007) (pay equity).
65 Eg Australian Iron & Steel v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165 (indirect sex discrimin-
ation); Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 (on the concept of dis-
crimination); Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 (torts: damages for domestic
services provided by the plaintiff’s wife).
66 Eg Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility) [1993] 2 FLR 1 (CA) (domestic
violence and child contact); Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS
Trust [2002] QB 266 (CA) (torts: wrongful conception); Fornah v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2006] UKHL 46, [2007] 1 AC 412 (asylum claim based on threat of
female genital mutilation); R v G [2008] UKHL 37, [2008] 1 WLR 1379 (child sexual
offences); Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534 (pre-nuptial con-
tracts); Yemshaw v Hounslow London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 3, [2011] 1 WLR 433
(domestic violence); R (on the application of McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal
London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 33, [2011] 4 All ER 881 (disabled woman’s care
needs). The exception may be R (on the application of Gentle)) v Prime Minister [2008]
UKHL 20, [2008] 1 AC 1356, which concerned claims by the mothers of two servicemen
killed in Iraq that a public inquiry should be held into the lawfulness of the UK’s invasion
of Iraq. While denying the claim, Hale expressed empathy for the claimants as mothers.
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classic gender issues concerning violence against women, reproduction,
and the valuation of women’s work, including unpaid care work. Again,
these high-profile cases are likely to represent only a small minority of the
relevant judge’s decisions overall. Thirdly, the examples of feminist judg-
ments given by the Australian judges in their interviews generally fell
within similar categories: domestic violence; rape, sexual assault, and
child sexual assault; post-divorce property division and spousal mainten-
ance; issues around sentencing mothers of young children to prison; and
the question of discounting tort damages because of a widow’s prospects
of remarriage.
The feminist judgment projects have demonstrated that ‘feminist’
issues and approaches can incorporate a wider range of cases than
simply ‘gender’ issues. For example, the English project includes cases
on property law concepts,67 commercial contracts,68 adult social care,69
minority sexual practices,70 and medical decision-making71 which apply
feminist theory to less obvious subject matters. Likewise, the Australian
project includes cases on voting rights,72 the right to a fair trial for indi-
gent defendants,73 environmental law,74 and consumer protection.75
Feminist legal scholars have analysed just about every area of law,76 and
have also pointed out the fundamentally gendered nature of legal dis-
course in general.77 Thus, feminist judgments may be found in cases
going well beyond the ‘typical’ areas identified.
Nevertheless, it appears that the opportunity for judging in a substan-
tively different way is likely to arise in only a minority of cases. This might
offer some comfort to those who fear the notion that a more diverse
See also Hale, ‘Fiona Woolf Lecture’ (n 50) 21, referring to particular judgments of hers
where she has brought in a different experience and perceptions of life.
67 Anna Grear, ‘Porter v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis’ in Hunter and others
(n 49) 174.
68 Mulcahy and Andrews (n 56).
69 Bibbings (n 55); Helen Carr and Caroline Hunter, ‘YL v Birmingham City Council
and Others’ in Hunter and others (n 49) 318.
70 Mackenzie (n 56).
71 Hastings (n 55).
72 Kim Rubenstein, ‘R v Pearson, ex parte Sipka’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 61.
73 Graycar and Morgan (n 56).
74 Godden (n 56).
75 Heron Loban, ‘ACCC v Keshow’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 180.
76 The ‘Feminist Perspectives. . .’ book series, for example, includes Susan Scott-Hunt
and Hilary Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (Cavendish Press 2001);
Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Contract Law (Cavendish
Press 2005); and Hilary Lim and Anne Bottomley (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Land Law
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
77 Eg Smart (n 40); Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes (Allen & Unwin 1990); Regina
Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press 1990).
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judiciary will have substantive implications. At the same time, it also
seems clear that the kinds of cases in which non-traditional judges
might make a substantive difference are precisely those cases in which
we would want the full range of human experience and understanding to
be brought to bear. It is in these cases that judicial diversity, by enabling
the issues to be examined through the lens of previously excluded per-
spectives, is likely to produce better justice.
It might be argued that this is all very well on an appellate court,
where different perspectives can be included in the process of collegial
decision-making,78 but it does not work for a trial court where there is a
single judge presiding and no way of guaranteeing that, say, a case raising
racial issues will get an ethnic minority judge, or one of the right ethnic
minority. In response, first, this makes it even more crucial that our ap-
pellate courts, which are currently the least diverse, rapidly become much
more so. Secondly, a quote from one of the Australian judicial inter-
viewees is illuminating:
. . . because judging is so extremely subjective, the more people you get from
various backgrounds and experiences the more fair your judging is going to
be. I mean . . . at the end of the day the individual person is stuck with the
individual judge that they get. But overall it’s going to be more fair because
you have different people, I think they influence each other. I mean, we talk
to each other about the sort of sentences we give and approaches . . . . You
influence each other by your general approaches to things. (Judge 36: Circuit
Court equivalent)
In other words, judicial conversations are not confined to appellate
courts, and the potential influence of non-traditional judges may
extend to the judgments of other judges in other cases as well as their own.
There may remain a concern that substantive differences in decision-
making might not result in greater fairness but will somehow corrupt the
law. It is therefore worth considering carefully what it is that a non-
traditional judge can actually do. If she sits on a first instance court and
makes an error of law, she can be overturned on appeal. If she sits on an
appellate court, she can, at worst, dissent. That is an entirely legitimate
option within our judicial system. Much has been written about the value
of dissents,79 and a little has been written on the dangers of too much
78 See Peresie (n 61); Etherton (n 22).
79 Eg Claire L’Heureux-Dube´, ‘The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?’ (2000)
38 Osgoode Hall LJ 495; Erika Rackley, ‘Difference in the House of Lords’ (2006) 15
Social L S 153; Hale (n 20).
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unanimity.80 The statistical analysis Erika Rackley and I have undertaken
shows that some of the judges on the UK Supreme Court had never (up to
July 2014) expressed a minority opinion. That might raise questions as to
what it is they contribute to the court. Alternatively, a non-traditional
appellate judge may write a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result
but for different reasons. Again, this is a legitimate option and the rea-
soning of the concurrence is open to public evaluation. Lastly, she may
write a joint judgment or leading judgment with which other members of
the court agree, because her reasoning is persuasive. Introducing a differ-
ent perspective into the judicial conversation is likely, at least sometimes,
to result in the value of that perspective being recognized by others. This
points to one of the strengths of the way the UK Supreme Court operates
compared to other countries, where the highest appellate court always sits
en banc. In such a system, the viewpoints and alignments on the court
become predictable and somewhat solidified. Madame Justice
L’Heureux-Dube´ in Canada and Justice Kirby in Australia, for example,
became known as great dissenters because their views and approaches
were often at odds with those of their judicial colleagues. But the UK
Supreme Court sits in constantly changing groups of five, seven, or nine
of the 12 justices, which creates the possibility for many different con-
versations depending on the particular combination of justices hearing
each case, and hence differences of views and approaches can play out
differently in different contexts.
A further observation arising from the Australian Feminist Judgments
Project is that feminist judgments may be remarkably legally orthodox,
formalist, and even conservative.81 In some of the common law cases in
that project, the feminist judge closely followed precedent when the ori-
ginal court had struck out into new doctrinal territory,82 or exercised
judicial restraint when the original court had in fact departed from
fundamental principles such as the separation of powers and the non-
retroactivity of criminal offences.83 For these feminist judges, the more
conservative approach was actually the better approach from a feminist
perspective. In statute-based cases, some of the feminist judgments paid
closer attention to the canons of statutory interpretation than the original
80 Eg Alan Paterson, ‘A Scarcity of Dissents?’, UKSC Blog (6 March 2014)
<http://ukscblog.com/scarcity-dissent/> accessed 20 March 2015.
81 For full discussion of this point, see Douglas and others (n 54) 32–34.
82 Eg Adrian Howe, ‘Parker v R’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 234; Lisa Sarmas, ‘Trustees
of the Property of John Daniel Cummins, a Bankrupt v Cummins’ in Douglas and others
(n 54) 212.
83 Eg, Graycar and Morgan (n 56); Wendy Larcombe and Mary Heath, ‘PGA v R’ in
Douglas and others (n 54) 262.
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court had shown.84 Illustrating the point that feminist judging is not a
singular programme, these cases demonstrate that a feminist judge will
not necessarily wish to push the boundaries of legal method. In some
instances, a feminist approach may in fact be a traditionally black-letter
approach.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that feminist judges may be more
prepared than their judicial brethren to give full effect to socially pro-
gressive legislation. As suggested in the earlier quote from Sally Kenney,
feminist judges might be relied upon to ‘interpret equal protection and
discrimination law in light of those provisions’ broad social change pur-
poses’.85 Similarly, there are several instances in the Australian Feminist
Judgments Project in which the feminist judge is concerned properly to
implement the legislature’s intention in enacting anti-discrimination
laws, compared to the original judgments which engaged in narrow
and hostile readings of the legislation which nullified its remedial pur-
poses.86 The practice of giving effect to rather than resisting or under-
mining law reforms also arose in the interviews with Australian feminist
judges. One of these judges recalled a committal hearing in which a
14-year-old girl who had allegedly been abducted, drugged, and sexually
assaulted, was subjected to a lengthy and aggressive cross-examination by
the defence barrister to an extent which, in the judge’s view, was not
permitted by the Evidence Act:
It occurred to me then that my task was to protect the witness to get the
[best] evidence, as well as protect [the defendant’s] rights which he certainly
had and I was very clear about that, but in the legislation this was how it
works. So when I came out and spoke to my colleagues they went, ‘oh, don’t
bother, it’s too hard’ . . .
So sadly, after she gave great evidence, I think I did a moderately good job.
I don’t think I did enough . . . but . . . it sets the boundaries for what you
think about, particularly as a feminist. You think this is just not fair, the
legislation’s here. It’s about my bravery in applying the law and being solid.
(Judge 18: Magistrates Court)
84 Eg Zoe Rathus and Renata Alexander, ‘Goode and Goode’ in Douglas and others (n 54)
379; Anita Stuhmcke, ‘JM v QFG and GK’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 397; Jennifer
Nielsen, ‘McLeod v Power’ in Douglas and others (n 54) 409.
85 Kenney (n 14) 15–16.
86 Stuhmcke (n 84); Beth Gaze, ‘The State of New South Wales v Amery’ in Douglas and
others (n 54) 424. The same may also be said of the first instance decision in JM v QFG and
GK [1997] QADT 5 (31 January 1997), which Stumcke upholds in her feminist judgment
(n 84).
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The notion of applying the law bravely is not one which is often spoken
about in our legal culture. Bravery is not on the Judicial Appointments
Commission’s list of judicial qualities and abilities. Perhaps, it ought to be.
Expectations
A third factor which might influence when non-traditional judges may
make a substantive difference in decision-making is the expectations at-
taching to their role. We have seen how judicial ideology discourages
performances of difference, but the situation could equally be reversed.
For example, Ruth Cowan has observed that:
In contrast to the assertions in the United States that judges function like
baseball umpires, in South Africa a frequently expressed and undisputed
justification for the appointment of those previously excluded by racism
and sexism is precisely so that they would and should provide perspectives
previously absent; that they would therefore be essential to advancing the
Constitution’s promises. African, Coloured, Asian and women judges were
and are expected to add value – they were and are expected to make a
difference in the decisions rendered . . .87
The same could be said about the feminist judgment projects, that they
precisely reverse the usual expectations, encouraging the provision of
‘perspectives previously absent’. Such expectations may, indeed, mitigate
(if not entirely obviate) the need for bravery on the part of non-traditional
judges in coming out as different and adding the substantive value of
which they are capable at the points where it matters. Of course, as
Rackley has argued, one would hope to get to a stage where we no
longer think in terms of ‘difference’ from a ‘norm’, but rather we just
have diversity.
Conclusion
To conclude, will a more diverse judiciary necessarily or even possibly
result in substantively different decision-making? The evidence suggests
that this may but will not inevitably occur. And it will only occur under
certain conditions. Those conditions are a combination of opportunity
(in terms of both subject matter and legal space), plus personal commit-
ment and/or external encouragement. Opportunities for most judges are
87 Cowan (n 19) 320–21.
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likely to occur relatively infrequently. That is not, of course, a reason for
soft pedalling on judicial diversity. As discussed at the outset, there are
many other good reasons for having a more diverse judiciary—in terms of
what the presence of non-traditional judges represents symbolically, how
they manage their courtrooms, and the contributions they make behind
the scenes and extrajudicially. But if we want a more diverse judiciary to
result in fairer decision-making for all members of the community, to
achieve ‘equal justice for all’,88 the opportunities must be grasped when
they do arise. This will require a shift from discouragement or at best
toleration of judicial difference to positively supporting and encouraging
substantive diversity. And it will require the appointment of judges who
have the commitment and courage to make a difference.
88 Kenney (n 14) 16.
23Judicial Diversity and Decision-Making
